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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the consequences of opening out-of-town big-boxes on the commercial structure of 
cities. I use a discontinuity in a commercial regulation in Spain that restricts the entry of big-box stores in 
municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants for the period 2003 to 2011. I then use this discontinuity as 
an instrument for the big-box opening. The results show that three years after the big-box opening, around 
15% of the grocery stores in the municipality have disappeared. However, some of the empty commercial 
premises are taken by other new small retailers in other sectors. As a result, the total number of retail stores 
in the municipality remains unchanged. These results show that a retail shock in the suburbs does not 
necessarily empty the city center but can also change only the composition of its commercial activity. 
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1. Introduction
Before 1990, many European countries underwent increasing market liberalization. As a 
consequence of which the retail sector, and the food retail sector in particular, expanded greatly 
with the opening of many new supermarkets. In the Spanish case, the five biggest supermarket 
chains opened their first stores in the 1970s, and by 1990 they accounted for 45% of the market, 
according to figures published by the Spanish Ministry of Economy2. In this way, a highly 
traditional sector, made up primarily of city center grocery stores, found itself up against a new 
type of competitor. The economic consequences of the opening up of these new supermarkets, 
typically out-of-town big-boxes, became an important policy concern in most countries. In 
particular, the main concern was (and still is) the impact of these stores on the quality of cities and 
their structure (see, for example, Basker, 2007, for an analysis of the impact of the growth of Wal-
Mart, one of the biggest big-box chains in the US). However, the proponents of big-box stores 
argue that they tend to push prices down, making consumers better off when they locate in their 
municipalities. In response, throughout the 1990s, many European countries, most notably the 
UK, Italy and France, introduced stringent policies to restrict the entry of big-box stores, or, at 
least, implemented controls on the type of store that could be built and where they could locate.  
In this paper, I exploit a similar regulation introduced in Spain in 1997 to evaluate the 
effects that the opening of such big-boxes have on the commercial structure of the city where they 
open. More specifically, I use the fact that cities fell under this regulation or not according to a 
population threshold. Implementing a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, I test whether the 
opening of big-box stores is emptying the city center of commercial activity. The results show that 
non-regulated municipalities experience 0.3-0.4 more big-box openings than regulated 
municipalities, or roughly 16% more. As a consequence, three years after the first big-box opening, 
around 15% of the grocery stores in the area disappear, offering clear evidence that city centers 
are losing part of their economic activity. However, the results on other retailers also indicate that 
this loss in grocery stores is compensated by the arrival of other type of small retailers. Almost 
60% of the new shops are devoted to home products, whereas the rest is much diversified. 
Additionally, results on the total number of shops – grocery and other – show that the overall 
number of stores in the municipality remains unchanged. These results point out that most of the 
recent concerns about big-box store openings hollowing out the city center of small/medium cities 
are relatively unlikely to occur.  
2 Informe de Distribución Comercial 2003 (http://www.comercio.mineco.gob.es/es-ES/comercio-
interior/Distribucion-Comercial-Estadisticas-y-Estudios/Pdf/InformeDistribucion_2003.pdf) 
3 
I also examine whether these effects differ according to the location of the big-box (city 
center vs. out-of-town) and the type of the big-box opened (conventional vs. discount). The results 
show a significant difference between big-box stores operating closer to the city center and those 
operating clearly in the suburbs. Moreover, they also show that conventional big-box stores (as 
opposed to discount ones) are the ones forcing to pull down grocery stores’ shutters. 
Several papers have examined the impact of planning (and/or commercial) regulations in 
the retail sectors of various countries. For instance, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) exploit a French 
regulation requiring regional approval for the opening of large retail stores. They show that this 
barrier to entry and high levels of concentration among large retail chains significantly reduce retail 
employment, stemming its growth rate. Schivardi and Viviano (2011) exploit a similar regulation 
in Italy and, using political variables as instruments, find that this entry barrier is associated with 
substantially larger profit margins and lower productivity of incumbent firms. Griffith and 
Harmgart (2008), for the UK case, build a theoretical model allowing for multiple store formats 
and introduce a restrictive planning regulation. They find that planning regulations have an impact 
on market equilibrium outcomes, although not as large as suggested by the previous literature. 
Haskel and Sadun (2012), also focusing on the UK retail sector, find that by preventing the 
emergence of more productive, large format stores and by increasing the costs of space, planning 
policies impede the growth of the sector’s total factor productivity (TFP). The same results are 
reported by Cheshire et al. (2015) in their examination of the effects of ‘Town Centre First’ policies 
in the UK’s large supermarket sector. They find that such policies directly reduce output by forcing 
stores onto less productive sites.  
Thus, the focus of the literature so far has been the direct productivity and employment 
effects of stringent regulations in the retail industry. In this paper, I change the object of analysis 
from the industry to the city. Although I make use of a similar regulation for identification 
purposes, the ultimate goal is to study the less direct consequences of these policies on other policy 
relevant issues such as city structure and city centers’ activity. 
The issues addressed in this paper are also closely related to another branch of the literature 
that examines the effects of big-boxes on grocery stores. Most studies here have analyzed the 
impact of Wal-Mart stores in the US. Basker (2005) reports an instantaneous positive effect of a 
Wal-Mart opening on retail employment, although the effect is halved five years after the opening. 
Others, including Neumark et al. (2008), using an instrumental variables approach, show that Wal-
Mart openings have a negative effect on retail employment and wages in US counties. Haltiwanger 
et al. (2010) use data from grocery stores in the Washington DC metropolitan area to evaluate the 
effects of the first Wal-Mart opening on grocery stores and small supermarkets. They find negative 
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effects of the big-box on other retailers, especially for those located closest to the Wal-Mart facility. 
The same results are reported by Ellickson and Grieco (2011) in their analysis of a panel dataset 
for the years 1994 to 2006 for the whole country. Jia (2008) also evaluates the effects of Wal-Mart 
openings on grocery stores but, in line with the present paper, focusing on their exit decisions.3 
Finally, using household microdata in Mexico, Atkin et al. (2018) evaluate the effects of foreign 
supermarkets’ entries on household welfare, finding that such entries reduced the cost of living for 
average Mexican households.  
However, the European food retail sector works very differently from that in the US or 
Mexico, given the continent’s different city structures and the agglomeration forces operating in 
its cities. Sadun (2015) is the only paper, to date, to analyze the European case. In a study of UK 
retailers, she finds that following the introduction of stringent policies, supermarket chains adapted 
the size of their outlets to the regulation resulting in stores that can compete even more directly 
with the grocery stores, harming them even more than before the policy. My findings showing the 
negative effects on grocery stores of closer-to-the-city-center big-boxes point in the same 
direction. Adopting a theoretical perspective, Uschev et al. (2015) build a model in which, 
combining spatial and monopolistic competition, they find that downtown retailers only gradually 
disappear when a big-box is sufficiently large. In line with this, my results also show that the 
opening of a big-box does not always translate in other shops disappearances but instead the city 
center changes its retail composition. 
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, the source of exogenous variation to 
study the effect of big-box store openings on a city’s commercial structure is generated by the 
commercial regulation itself. This allows for a clearer identification than that of the current 
literature. In fact, the previous literature has relied on political instruments that exploit the fact 
that left-wing politicians tend to favor regulation (see Sadun, 2015 or Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002). 
My approach, instead, uses arbitrary population thresholds to generate quasi-random variation in 
commercial regulations directly and thus allows for an arguably cleaner identification. Second, to 
the best of my knowledge, all papers in the existing literature have focused on the direct 
productivity or employment effects of big-box store openings while this paper examines other 
outcomes – such as city structure – that have arisen as concerns in recent years and that could 
potentially drive new waves of regulations in the future. Finally, this is the first paper drawing on 
all available data for big-box openings and, hence, distinguishing the effects by location and type 
3 Other studies of the impact of Wal-Mart stores, including Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2009), focus on other 
outcomes such as grocery store prices. 
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of these stores. Previous studies in the US have been limited to the role played by Wal-Mart stores 
and studies in the UK have also focused on a unique retail company.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional setting as 
well as the regulation exploited while Section 3 introduces the different data sources. Section 4 
states the empirical strategy and presents the results for the first stage estimations, i.e. the effect of 
the commercial regulation on big-box openings. Section 5 shows the results of the effect of big-
box openings on grocery stores, other retailers and total number of shops and reports some 
robustness tests and heterogeneous effects. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Institutional setting
Between 1985 and the mid-1990s, Spain experienced a change in its market structure with the 
complete international liberalization of the retail sector, affecting above all the food retail trade4. 
Thus, a market that had previously been dominated by independent grocery stores saw the arrival 
of the (mostly foreign) chain supermarket. These changes ushered in a major policy debate between 
those in favor and those opposed to trade liberalization and free market entry. This debate became 
even more heated when the supermarket chains began opening large out-of-town stores. The 
opponents of such stores argue that big-box openings create enormous externalities for the local 
community, including more pollution, distortions to the existing retail market structure and the 
hollowing-out of city centers. One of their main arguments is that these stores affect the pre-
existing body of firms, especially small, traditional businesses, causing their eventual disappearance 
from the area. 
To prevent this from happening and in response to the growing unrest in the sector, in 
1996, the Spanish parliament passed the Retail Trade Law 7/1996. Among other things, this law 
aimed at restricting the entry of big-big stores.5 The law required a developer seeking to open a 
big-box store in Spain to obtain a second license, in this case from the regional government, in 
addition to the municipal license. The fact that the two licenses (municipal and regional) had to be 
solicited from two different entities meant that big-box developers incurred an additional entry 
cost vis-à-vis other type of stores. While this was not a monetary cost, it did represent a 
considerable cost in terms of time and uncertainty given the amount of red tape that developers 
had to contend with in applying for this second license.  
4 Matea and Mora-Sanguinetti (2009) show an increase in restrictiveness from the late 1990s with respect to the 
previous decade 
5 The law also regulated store opening hours as well as licences for hard discount stores.  
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The central government opted to define a big-box as one with at least 2,500m2. However, 
nine (out of Spain’s seventeen) regions chose to strengthen the law by further limiting the number 
of square meters. This they did in line with the population of their municipalities. Thus, in smaller 
cities a more restrictive definition was placed on the size of big-box stores, making their market 
entry even more difficult. These measures were introduced between 1997 and 2004.6 The regions 
adopted different arbitrary population thresholds below which the restrictions became more 
stringent. In my analysis, I focus on those municipalities centered around 10,000 inhabitants. For 
most regions, this was the lowest population threshold. This means that, for all regions, 
municipalities below the 10,000-population threshold restrict the opening of big-box stores, while 
municipalities above this threshold are non-regulated. Note that three regions did in fact define 
lower thresholds, but these are discarded because they do not provide enough observations to 
perform the analysis. Additionally, most Spanish municipalities are very small (almost 60% have 
less than 5,000 inhabitants), which means establishing a threshold above 10,000 would only capture 
restrictions for a specific set of large cities. Thus, using a larger threshold would not be operative 
here either. For the same reason, there will be more observations to the left of the threshold than 
there are to the right. Table 1 shows the specific details of the regulations – size restrictions and 
the year they were introduced – for the nine regions included in the analysis. Note that the 
definition of a big-box varies across the regions, ranging from 600 to 1,500 m2. In the empirical 
analysis I use each region’s specific definition, but I also include region fixed effects in all the 
estimations. As such, the analysis undertakes a within region comparison.  
3. Data and sample
I use two different datasets to perform the analysis. First, data concerning the openings of big-box 
stores are drawn from a private dataset compiled by Alimarket, S.A, a company that generates 
information (from sources that range from news articles to databases) for different industries in 
Spain. I draw specifically on their food and beverages dataset and use their 2011 Census of Chain 
Supermarkets in Spain. I use the 2011 census because after that year, some of the affected regions 
modified some aspects of their commercial regulation, potentially affecting the identification of 
the question at hand. For each big-box, this census contains information on its date of opening, 
exact location, size (in square meters) and the chain to which it belongs. Although this is not a 
panel dataset, the time dimension can be added by exploiting the information on the date each 
6 Note that the adoption of the regulation was not a party-political issue as the nine regions were governed by different 
parties with different ideologies at the time of its introduction. Four regions had a socialist party in office, three were 
governed by a conservative party and the other two regions were governed by regional nationalist parties. 
7 
big-box store was opened. This means that, as with any census, the dataset only contains 
information on the stores surviving in 2011. However, the closure of a big-box store, especially in 
the period analyzed, is highly unlikely.7 It should be stressed at this juncture that information 
regarding the number of licenses per municipality is unavailable, which means little can be said 
about the administrative process for the granting of licenses. Indeed, I am only able to observe 
those that met with success (i.e. the actual number of big-box openings per municipality and year). 
For information on grocery and other retail stores (i.e., the outcome variables), I use the Anuario 
Económico de España (AEE), a municipality dataset, for the period 2003 to 2011. This dataset 
includes detailed local demographic and economic variables for municipalities with more than 
1,000 inhabitants. More specifically, in the case of the food retail sector, it records the exact 
number of stores in each Spanish municipality and year, classifying them in two categories: 
traditional stores (i.e. grocery stores) and supermarkets (i.e. chain stores, not necessarily big-boxes). 
The number of traditional stores is used to identify the effects of big-box openings on grocery 
store closures. According to the literature (for example, Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002) and 
anecdotal evidence from local planners in Spain (provided by Matea and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2009), 
four years would appear to be the plausible average time lag between applying for a license to build 
a big-box store and its eventual opening. This means that the effects of the 1997 regional regulation 
would not make themselves manifest until 2001 and so the period of analysis should start in 2001. 
However, the AEE only began distinguishing between grocery stores and supermarkets in 2003, 
further restricting the period of analysis from 2003 to 2011, the latter year corresponding to the 
Alimarket Census. In the case of the other retailers (i.e. the non-food stores), the AEE also splits 
them into different types. They are classified as clothes and shoes shops, home products shops – 
these being furniture, home appliances or home textile shops – and other retail shops – including 
stores such as book shops, beauty and perfumery or flower stores, among others. These different 
counts of shops will be used to analyze the effects of big-box openings on other retailers. 
There are a number of other variables that may, at the same time, be influencing the 
numbers of big-box openings and grocery stores or other retail stores. In order to control for this, 
local economic and socio-demographic variables extracted from the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 2001 Census are used. Specifically, I use an index representing the average 
economic activity of each municipality, computed by the INE using data about the occupation and 
professional activity of the population in the municipality. Additionally, I also use two indicators 
7 Using the 2007 Census of Chain Supermarkets it can be verified that between 2007 and 2011 there were no big-box 
closures, that is, those stores operating before 2007 remained in the sample in 2011. This is indeed reassuring since 
the financial crisis took place in between both census and yet no big-box was closed.  
8 
of education levels: compulsory education and post-compulsory education, defined as a percentage 
of the overall local population. I also include the share of immigrants as a percentage of the overall 
population and the share of the services sector within a municipality’s total activities. Finally, based 
on data from the AEE I also include the surface of the municipality, measured in km2. Table 2 
shows the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables, i.e. number of grocery stores, number 
of other retail stores by category and overall number of stores at the municipality level, as well as 
for the control variables. Their values are all presented around the threshold (+/- 3,000 inhabitants 
from the 10,000 threshold).  
As discussed above, there is, on average, a four-year lag between the developers applying 
for a license and the big-box being opened. Therefore, as I only observe the date of opening but 
the regulation applies from the moment developers request the license, each opening has to be 
matched with its corresponding population at a point four years earlier – that is, I match the 
openings from 2003 to 2011 with population data from 1999 to 2007, respectively, as extracted 
from INE data. The initial pooled sample size comprises a total of 5,937 municipalities per year 
belonging to the nine regions that strengthened the central law. I restrict the sample to 
municipalities with between 1,000 and 30,000 inhabitants that did not have a big-box store before 
the onset of my period of analysis8. This shrinks the sample to 1,754 municipalities. I also exclude 
a further 92 municipalities that crossed the threshold before the opening happened. Finally, I only 
include municipalities once the region in which they lie has implemented the regulation; thus, for 
each year, I only observe the regulated regions’ municipalities. This means that I can only estimate 
the post-regulation effect.9 Table 3 reports the number of municipalities, i.e. the sample size, and 
the number of big-box openings per year. 
4. Identification strategy
The openings of big-box stores are not randomly allocated in space or time. The main concern is 
that the same characteristics that determine the location of such big-box stores might be correlated 
with the outcomes of interest, either directly or through other unobservable characteristics. As a 
consequence, an OLS estimation of the effect would lead to problematic estimates. In order to 
overcome this problem, I use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) framework to estimate 
the effects of big-box openings on cities’ commercial structure. As discussed, to build a big-box 
8 Note that municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants are also excluded from the sample due to AEE data 
availability. 
9 It would have been interesting to estimate the before- and after-policy effects but, as the study period starts in 2003, 
I lack pre-regulation data for three of the regions.  
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store in a municipality of less than 10,000 inhabitants, a second regional license is required. 
However, this license should be seen as an additional barrier to entry, and not as a binding 
constraint. Therefore, this regulation only changed the probability of  opening a big-box and hence, 
the setting requires the use of a “fuzzy” RDD, the crucial assumption being that there is a 
discontinuity in the probability of assignment at the threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008 and 
Lee and Lemieux, 2010 for a fuller discussion of “sharp” and “fuzzy” RDDs). In other words, the 
probability of establishing a big-box store jumps on crossing the threshold from regulated to non-
regulated municipalities. This is the so-called ‘first stage’ that is used afterwards as an instrument 
in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to identify the causal effect. In this section, I begin 
by examining this first stage; that is, testing whether there are systematically more openings in non-
regulated municipalities than there are in their regulated counterparts around the threshold.  
The “fuzzy” RDD relies on the assumption that the probability of assignment to treatment 
jumps at a particular threshold and, as such, this can be used as a source of exogenous variation. 
However, this assumption needs to be tested. Figure 1 shows the jump in the number of big-box 
openings at the threshold. Panel (a) presents the results for a first order polynomial fit while panel 
(b) reports the results for a second order polynomial. In both cases I observe a jump at the 
threshold of around 0.3-0.4. This means that when crossing from regulated to non-regulated 
municipalities, there are, on average, 0.3-0.4 more big-box openings, corresponding to 
approximately 16% more openings than in regulated municipalities. We also see that there is very 
little difference when fitting polynomials of different order. In order to assess this more formally, 
I estimate variants of the following equation:  
big-box openings it =  it +  βit∙Tit + γit∙f (Pi,t-4) + δt + θr + Xit' ω + εit (1) 
where big-box openings it  is the number of big-box openings in municipality i up to time t, that is, 
the change in the stock of big-box stores up to time t. The variable that identifies the jump in 
treatment is Tit, which takes a value equal to one if the municipality is above the threshold and 
zero otherwise. The forcing variable is the four-year lagged population (Pi,t-4), which enters the 
equation using different polynomial degrees. The regression also includes a set of control variables 
(Xit' ) and region and time fixed effects to control for time invariant region characteristics and
countrywide shocks, respectively. Additionally, the region fixed effect controls for the fact that the 
regulation varies by region; thus, by incorporating this fixed effect, I am performing a within-
region analysis. The controls are included in order to capture variables that might affect both big-
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box store openings and the change in the number of either grocery stores or other retail stores. 
These are the pre-regulation levels of population, economic activity, education levels, size of the 
municipality (in km2), immigration, unemployment rate and the importance of the services sector. 
Table 4 presents the results of this first stage equation, i.e. the effect of commercial 
regulation on the number of big-box openings. The first four columns show the results of 
estimating equation (1) using polynomial regressions while the last three present the results of 
estimating the same equation using local linear regressions. For the polynomial regressions, I use 
first- and second-degree polynomial fits, which according to Figure 1 would seem to fit the data 
well.10 Columns (1) and (2) show the results without the control variables while columns (3) and 
(4) report the results when including them. All the regressions seem to adapt well to the features 
presented by the raw data in Figure 1. The preferred estimation is the one in column (4), which 
presents a better fit and controls for observables that may be influencing both the outcome and 
the explanatory variable. Columns (5) to (7) report the results of local linear regression estimations 
using the Calonico et al. (2014a) methodology11. Column (5) presents the results for the optimal 
bandwidth while columns (6) and (7) show the results for half and twice the optimal bandwidth, 
respectively. All the results also show a jump in treatment at the threshold of around 0.3-0.4 – or 
slightly higher – coinciding with the graphical inspection.  
One assumption of the RDD strategy is that the ‘forcing’ variable must be continuous at 
the threshold. In order to reject any manipulation of this forcing variable, I inspect the histogram 
of the population around the threshold. A more formal way of assessing this is to run local linear 
regressions of the density of the forcing variable on both sides of the threshold, as proposed by 
McCrary (2008). Figure 2 presents the results of both methods for examining the continuity of the 
forcing variable at the threshold. Panel (a) shows the histogram of the population using different 
bin widths: the largest width is 1,000 inhabitants; the mid-scale is 400 inhabitants and the smallest 
is 200 inhabitants. Panel (b) shows the results of the McCrary test. In both cases, we observe that 
the forcing variable is not discontinuous at the threshold. Interestingly, Foremny et al. (2017), in a 
study of Spanish local government manipulation of reported population levels to obtain higher 
transfers, conclude that municipalities around the 10,000 threshold do not misreport their 
population numbers as grants do not change at this threshold. 
A further assumption that must be met in order for an RDD to work is that no other 
variable at the municipality level should experience a jump at the threshold to avoid confounding. 
10 I also estimated the regressions using a third-degree polynomial fit, but the polynomial turned out to be non-
significant. 
11
 Updated in Calonico, Cattaneo and Farrell (2017). 
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In order to test that this does not occur in this setting, at least for the observables, I examine the 
continuity of the control variables used in the regression (i.e. those reported in Table 2) at the 
threshold. I adjust local linear regressions on each side of the threshold for each of the control 
variables and plot them. Figure 3 shows the results. As can be seen, none of the control variables 
presents a jump at the threshold and, therefore, the coefficient previously estimated is only 
capturing the effect of the regulation on big-box openings.  
In order to test the robustness of these first stage results, I estimate equation (1) again, but 
instead of using the sample of post-regulation municipalities, I perform the analysis using the non-
regulated municipalities in each year, i.e. the pre-regulation sample. If this placebo exercise works, 
there should be no difference in the number of big-box openings around the threshold. Table 5 
reports the results of this placebo test. The structure of the table is the same as that in Table 4, 
with the first four columns presenting the results for polynomial regressions with and without 
control variables and the last three columns showing the results for local linear regressions. All the 
estimations show that there is no difference between municipalities around the threshold prior to 
the regulation. Thus, this gives further support that the difference in the number of big-box 
openings at the threshold identified in Table 4 is due to the causal effect of the commercial 
regulation. 
5. Results
In this section, I first present the results of the 2SLS regressions estimating the effects of big-box 
openings on grocery store closures, the closest competitors to the big-box stores. In addition, a 
number of robustness tests of these results as well as the potentially heterogeneous effects of the 
location and type of big-box opened are evaluated. Then, I evaluate the effects of big-box openings 
on other stores that are not competing directly with the big-box but populate the city center as 
well. Finally, I estimate the effects on the overall numbers of retail shops in the city center in order 
to evaluate the total effect on the cities’ commercial structure. 
5.1. The impact of big-box openings on grocery stores 
I estimate the following 2SLS equation, where the key variable regarding the opening of big-box 
stores is instrumented with the treatment variable from the first stage (Tit) obtained when 
estimating equation (1): 
∆ grocery storesit= θit +  φit∙big-box openingsit + σit∙g (Pi,t-4) + ρt + πr + Xit' + ϵit       (2) 
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where ∆ grocery storesit is the change in the number of grocery stores between t and t-n (where n is
between 1 and 6) aggregated at the municipality level. This equation is also estimated for the two 
different degrees of polynomial fit: a first-degree and a second-degree fit. As before, 
big-box openingsit  is the number of big-box openings in municipality i up to time t, so it also
represents the change in the stock of big-box stores. The regression also includes the same control 
variables as in the first stage, (Xit' ) as well as region and time fixed effects. The coefficient of interest
is φit, which can be interpreted as the ratio between two “sharp” RDDs. The “intent-to-treat”
estimation, i.e. a reduced form of the effect of Tit on grocery storesit , is divided by βit obtained from
equation (1). 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the effects of big-box openings on grocery store 
closures using polynomial regressions. Note that I move away from estimating local linear 
regressions in the second stage due to the lack of observations around the threshold. Unlike the 
first stage which includes the whole sample, the second stage regressions are estimated in different 
periods of time. As a consequence, each municipality is only observed once in the regression and 
the number of observations reduces dramatically, especially around the threshold. However, as a 
robustness check, I do run local linear regressions in Table A1 columns (1) and (2) in the Appendix 
where the point estimates are consistent with the findings but non-significant since the small 
sample size pushes standard errors up. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, the control variables are 
not included, while in columns (3) and (4) they are. To test whether there are any effects of big-
box openings on grocery stores, equation (2) is estimated using the change between t and t-1, t and 
t-2, t and t-3, t and t-4, t and t-5 and t and t-6. Specifically, I estimate the equation separately for 
each of these six-time spans, their results being presented in each row of Table 6 and showing the 
cumulative effect as time passes from the first opening. As in Table 4, my preferred specification 
is the one in the fourth column. Examining the results in Table 6, it can be seen that the opening 
of big-box stores has some negative effects on the number of grocery stores, mostly after two 
years of the opening. Around five grocery stores have shut down two years after a big-box opening 
and the number of closures increases to between 8 and 9 stores by the end of the third year. To 
put these numbers into perspective, they should be compared with the means around the threshold 
reported in Table 2. Thus, losing between 8 and 9 grocery stores in the three-year period represents 
a loss of around a 15% of the existing grocery stores in an area where a big-box store has opened. 
It is important to note that not all regions passed the law at the same time and some of 
them did so relatively late. As a consequence, despite presenting the results beyond three years 
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from the first opening, the results for the fourth, fifth and sixth differences do not include all the 
regions that strengthened the law but only those that did it first. However, it is reassuring to see 
that the regressions representing the effects four, five and six years after the opening present very 
similar coefficients to those of the third year after, showing that the impact seems to be 
concentrated within the first three years following the opening. In order to be able to work with 
the full sample, I will estimate all the remaining results in my paper using the longest time 
difference where I can observe everybody, i.e. t and t-3.  
My baseline results are robust to different alternative specifications. Table A1 in the 
Appendix shows the results of estimating equation (2) in four different settings: using local linear 
regressions, including the municipalities that experienced an opening before the regional law was 
passed and using the three-year and five-year lagged population as the forcing variable. It also 
presents the first stage results for each of the four tests. All results show very similar results to 
those described before.  
The previous results confirm the negative effect of big-box openings on the number of 
pre-existing grocery stores which are the direct competitors of the big-boxes. This implies that the 
commercial regulation restricting the opening of big-box stores may be fulfilling its main goal, 
namely, the protection of grocery stores. However, we need to evaluate any other indirect effects 
that this regulation may have. The most straightforward one is the impact that the entry of big-
boxes could have on employment in the municipality. Typically, grocery stores in Spain are family-
owned business that do not usually hire any extra staff. On average, the size of such stores is 0.98 
employees plus the owner12, giving an average total of 1.98 jobs per grocery store. Thus, for every 
grocery store forced to pull down its shutters, 1.98 jobs are lost. Using the coefficients from my 
preferred specification in Table 6, about 9 grocery stores were found to shut down three years 
after a big-box opening, which means a municipality loses around 18 jobs. However, this number 
needs to be put into perspective, as we have to consider the number of jobs created when a big-
box store is opened. On average, a big-box store employs 42 employees.13 Therefore, the net 
employment effect would be an increase of around 24 jobs. So, even if the commercial regulation 
is preventing the disappearance of grocery stores, it may also have an indirect negative net effect 
on local employment. Unfortunately, detailed data on employment figures at the municipality level 
for small and medium municipalities in Spain do not exist, so that I cannot test this back-of-the-
envelope calculation rigorously. Such data are only available for municipalities beyond 40,000 
12
 Extracted from the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture’s database. 
13 This average is computed using data available in the 2011 Census of Chain Supermarkets, which reports (in some 
instances) the number of employees in big-box stores. The number has been corroborated by examining information 
available on the websites of the main chains of big-box stores in Spain. 
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inhabitants, a threshold far too big for the focus of this paper. However, these back-of-the-
envelope calculations are consistent with the theoretical predictions and the policy 
recommendations made in Ushchev et al. (2015), who also find that big-box openings tend to 
hollow out city centers, but that the regulation should only be implemented when malls are not 
efficient enough to capture the whole market. 
It is important to note that the above results also depend on the exact definition (size in 
square meters) of a big-box store. In fact, each region, as observed in Table 1, sets its own limits 
on what it considers a big-box store. Thus, it might be the case that chains seek to bypass the 
regulation by building stores just below the threshold (in order for the store not to be considered 
a big-box) and so they can avoid having to apply for a second license. Indeed, in the case of the 
UK, Sadun (2015) reports evidence of this actually happening, thus undermining the regulation. 
This paper has shown that opening a new big-box store reduces the number of grocery stores. 
Therefore, were we to observe a bunching of stores just below the threshold in those 
municipalities, this would only indicate that the previous results are biased towards finding a zero 
effect. Figure 4 presents the size distribution of chain stores computed using the 2011 Census of 
Chain Supermarkets dataset. It reports this distribution for municipalities below the 10,000 
inhabitants’ threshold. Given that the regions included in the study have different size definitions 
for a big-box store, the size axis has been normalized. As can be seen, there is indeed evidence of 
bunching just below the threshold, indicating that some chains have tried to avoid the regulation. 
Thus, this graph presents evidence that, while the previous findings indicate an impact of big-box 
openings on grocery stores, it may be an underestimate of the real effect, in terms of store closures. 
5.2. Heterogeneous effects of big-box openings on grocery stores 
My results so far describe the average impact of all big-box openings on grocery stores within the 
period analyzed, regardless of the specific characteristics of the big-box store opened. In this 
section, I evaluate whether the effects are driven by the location of the big-box – closer or further 
away from the city center – or the typology of big-box opened – conventional versus discount big-
box stores. Note that the total number of big-box openings is 270 (Table 3). Of these, 72 were 
opened closer to the city centers while 198 were located clearly in the suburbs. Likewise, by 
typology, 106 correspond to discount supermarkets and 164 to conventional chain stores. The 
reason for exploring any (possible) geographical effects of big-box openings is that big-box stores 
opening in locations closer to existing grocery stores, i.e., in city centers, might be competing more 
directly with these small shops and harming them more (Sadun, 2015). On the other hand, it might 
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also be the case that certain complementarities are created between big-box and grocery stores, 
stimulating demand for non-substitutable products. To this end, I estimate the following equation: 
∆ grocery storesit= θit +  φit∙big-box openingsit + μit∙big-box openingsit∙locations + τ∙location𝑠+σit∙g (Pi,t-4) +
+ ρt + πr + Xit' + ϵit      (3) 
where ∆ grocery storesit is the change in the number of grocery stores between t and t-3 aggregated
at the municipality level, indicating only the cumulative effect three years after the big-box opening. 
The variable locations indicates the location of the big-box store. It takes a value equal to one if the 
big-box opens close the city center, that is less than 2km away from the town hall, and a value 
equal to zero if it locates more than 2km away from the city center. It is important to keep in mind 
that these cities are relatively small, so that there is almost no commercial activity 2km away from 
the city center. In the regression, this indicator is interacted with the main explanatory variable 
and, thus, I can estimate the opening effect allowing for some geographical differences in how big-
box openings may affect grocery store closures. The results are presented in the first two columns 
of Table 7. I find that there are negative effects of big-box openings on grocery stores when the 
opening happens closer to the city center and no significant effects for the more suburban 
openings. Thus, we can conclude that the shock that a big-box opening represents to the city 
center’s commercial structure is bigger when its location is closer to that of its direct competitors. 
These findings point in the same direction as those reported by Sadun (2015) for the UK.   
Additionally, I evaluate whether the effects from Table 6 differ depending on the typology 
of the big-box opened. I divided the sample into two different types of big-boxes: conventional 
and discount stores. The former are those chains that sell well-known brands, whereas the latter 
typically sell their own, lower price brands. To evaluate whether there is any differential effect 
between these two types, the following equation is estimated: 
∆ grocery storesit= θit +  φit∙big-box openingsit + μit∙big-box openingsit∙types + τ∙type𝑠+σit∙g (Pi,t-4) + ρt +
+ πr + Xit'  + ϵit  (4) 
where ∆ grocery storesit is again the change in the number of grocery stores between t and t-3. The
variable types indicates the typology of the big-box store, taking a value equal to zero if the big-box
is conventional and one if it is a discount one. The results of interacting this indicator with the 
variable capturing the big-box opening are presented in the last two columns of Table 7. We see 
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that there is a clear negative and significant effect of big-box openings on grocery store closures 
when the big-box is conventional. In contrast, discount big-boxes do not seem to have any impact 
on grocery store closures. These results may be indicating a persistence of consumer preferences. 
It could be that consumers are used to certain kinds of products and brands and do not easily 
switch to unknown products even if they can be purchased relatively cheaper in discount big-box 
stores. Thus, conventional big-box stores may be competing more directly with grocery stores. 
They sell the same products but in a one-stop shop, which could be more convenient for 
consumers than having to make the two or more stops typically needed when buying food from 
grocery stores. So, both heterogeneity results point into the same direction: the closer the big-box 
is to the current set of traditional grocery stores in a municipality, both geographically and in terms 
of products sold, the bigger the harm to them after the opening. 
5.3. The effects of big-box openings on other retailers and on the overall city center’s 
commercial structure 
The results presented in the previous sections show that big-box openings are a big threat to 
grocery stores, which are mainly located in the city center and competing for the same consumers. 
Therefore, in line with these results, it might be the case that the opening of such big-boxes is 
indeed hollowing out the city center if the grocery stores that disappear are not replaced by other 
shops. In order to assess this, I estimate equation (2) but, instead of taking the change in the 
number of grocery stores as the dependent variable, I use the change in the number of other 
retailers’ shops between t and t-3. This variable is also computed in the AEE dataset and also split 
into different types of stores for the period 2003-2011. More specifically, the “non-food” stores 
are classified as clothes and shoes shops, home products shops, these being furniture, home 
appliances or home textile shops and other retail shops. The last category includes stores such as 
book shops, beauty and perfumery or flower stores, among others. By performing this exercise, I 
am able to see the indirect effects of these openings on stores that are not selling the same type of 
products as the big-boxes that opened. 
Table 8 presents the results of the effects of big-box openings on all the retailers excluding the 
grocery stores. In particular, it presents the results for the three different types of non-food stores: 
clothes and shoes, – columns (1) and (2) – home products, – columns (3) and (4) – and others – 
columns (5) and (6). Additionally, the last two columns present the overall results for all non-food 
retailers. The results show that big-box openings have a small negative effect on clothes and shoes 
stores but a significantly positive effect on home products and other small retailers. In fact, the 
sum of these three effects has a net positive effect of around 12 new non-food stores in the 
17 
municipalities. Therefore, whereas three years after the big-box opening around 8-9 grocery stores 
are closed, within the same years, around 12 other retailers open new shops. This implies that the 
commercial premises that the grocery stores leave empty are filled by other type of small retailers. 
More specifically, more than the 60% of the new shops are devoted to home products whereas 
the rest is much diversified.  
After analyzing the effects of big-box stores on food and non-food stores, I  find that a 
big-box store opening is a big threat to grocery stores, their biggest competitor, making them shut 
down after the opening, but it also encourages other retailers to take the empty premises. The next 
question then is what the overall effect on the city center’s commercial structure is. If the negative 
effect on the direct competitors is bigger, planning policies that restrict the opening of big-boxes 
might also help to prevent the hollowing-out of city centers. However, if the positive effects on 
other retailers are bigger than those for grocery stores, we can conclude that retail shocks in the 
suburbs of cities do not necessarily translate into a loss of city center’s commercial activity but 
only a change in its composition.  In order to assess this, I estimate equation (2) again, using the 
change in the number of all retailers’ shops (grocery stores and non-food stores) between t and t-
3. The results are presented in columns (5) and (6) in Table 9. Columns (1) to (2) and (3) to (4)
show again the results for grocery stores of Table 6 and for non-food retailers of Table 8, 
respectively. Figure 5 depicts the results graphically. By looking at the coefficients in columns (5) 
and (6) we can observe that the loss in grocery stores is fully compensated by the appearance of 
other new retailers in the municipality, leaving the overall number of retailers unchanged. 
Therefore, none of the rationales behind planning policies aimed at restricting the entry of big-
box stores seems to be valid. In big cities in the UK, where the worry was productivity and 
employment, Sadun (2015) already showed that, if anything, restrictions were harmful. In this 
paper, I show that for small to medium cities where the worry is mainly focused on the 
disappearance of the city center’s commercial structure, there are also no negative net effects.  
6. Conclusions
The opening of big-box stores has become a political concern in many countries over the last few 
decades. Their critics claim they create enormous negative externalities in pre-existing market and 
city structures, exacerbating pollution levels and contributing to the hollowing out of city centers, 
as grocery stores, their main competitors, are forced into closure. Yet, there are those who argue 
that these stores tend to push prices down and, so, consumers are better off when big-box stores 
locate to their municipalities. In this paper, I exploit a commercial regulation in Spain, aimed at 
restricting the entry of big-box stores, to evaluate the extent to which these openings cause changes 
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in the city center’s commercial structure. More specifically, this regulation requires developers 
seeking to build a big-box store in a municipality with less than 10,000 inhabitants to obtain a 
second license from the regional government, in addition to the municipal one.  
Using an RDD analysis, I first test whether this regulation does in fact prevent developers 
from establishing big-box stores in regulated municipalities. The findings show that non-regulated 
municipalities experienced 0.3-0.4 more openings than regulated municipalities. This corresponds 
to about 16% more openings. I then used this jump around the threshold to instrument the effect 
of big-box openings on the city’s commercial structure. The results suggest that, following the 
opening of a big-box, the affected municipality gradually loses grocery stores, showing some 
evidence of downtown hollowing out. In fact, three years after the opening, around 15% of the 
pre-existing grocery stores have closed down. When evaluating the heterogeneity of these effects, 
I find that the closer the big-box is to the current set of traditional grocery stores, both 
geographically and in terms of product sold, the larger its adverse effects. However, even if a big-
box store opening is a big threat to grocery stores, my results also indicate that it does not seem 
to be the case for the city center’s commercial activity as a whole. In fact, I find that the overall 
number of retailers remains unchanged, suggesting that new retail stores take over the empty 
commercial premises. The big-box only affects the composition of the commercial activity in the 
city center, but it does not make it disappear.  
My findings have a number of policy implications. First, the regulation introduced was 
designed to restrict the entry of big-boxes and as such to prevent grocery stores from closing. This 
paper has shown that this aim has indeed been met, given that non-regulated municipalities 
suffered more closures than regulated municipalities. However, while the regulation may have 
served its purpose, there may be other indirect effects that need to be taken into consideration. 
For instance, my results indicate a greater number of non-grocery retail stores. Because of this, the 
overall employment or productivity effects of the policy are unclear. For example, if the loss of 
jobs generated by the closure of grocery stores is offset by the employment created by the big-box 
opening and the new stores, the net employment effect would be positive. Additionally, if the 
exiting grocery stores are less productive than the new entrants, also average productivity might 
have increased. Unfortunately, due to data availability this is very difficult to test in the Spanish 
case, but it might be a promising avenue for further research. 
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Figure 1: Jump in the number of big-box stores at the threshold 
Panel (a) 
Panel (b) 
Note: Panel (a) shows bin averages of the number of big-box openings adjusting a  
linear polynomial at each side of the threshold. Panel (b) shows bin averages of the 
number of big-box openings adjusting a quadratic polynomial at each side of the  
threshold. 
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Figure 2: Continuity of the forcing variable at the threshold 
(a) Histogram (b) McCrary (2008) test 
Note: Panel (a) shows the histogram for three different bin widths: 1,000, 400 and 200 inhabitants. Panel (b) presents 
the results of the McCrary test, consisting on running local linear regressions at both sides of the threshold. The circles 
represent bins of the population density.  
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Figure 3: Continuity of the control variables 
Note: All graphs present local linear regressions of the control variables on each side of the threshold. Starting from 
the top left corner the variables shown are economic activity, compulsory education, post-compulsory education, 
surface (in km2), share of immigrants, unemployment rate and importance of the services sector. 
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      Figure 4: Bunching around the threshold of big-box sizes 
        Note: This figure shows a frequency histogram of the number of big-box openings around the 
        Threshold for municipalities smaller than 10,000 inhabitants. The size (in square meters) is  
        normalized according to the criterion of each region in order to consider a store a ‘big-box’. 
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Figure 5: Jump at the threshold. Grocery stores, other retailers and all retailers 
Notes: (1) The variables plotted are the change in the number of grocery stores, other retailers’ shops 
and all retailers in the municipality between t, and t-3. (2) All graphs show bin averages of the change 
in the number of grocery stores, other retailers’ shops or all retailers in the municipality adjusting a 
quadratic polynomial at each side of the threshold. 
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Table 1: Commercial regulations per region for the 10,000 inhabitants’ threshold 
Region Size restrictions Year of introduction 
Andalucía > 1000 m2 2003 
Castilla y León > 1000 m2 1997 
Castilla-la Mancha > 750 m2 2004 
Catalunya > 800 m2 2001 
Extremadura > 750 m2 2002 
Illes Balears > 400 m2 2001 
La Rioja > 1000 m2 1997 
Comunidad de Madrid > 1500 m2 1999 
País Vasco > 800 m2 2001 
Note: The table shows the definition of big-box store used in each of the nine regions that strengthened the 
central law and the year this regional law was introduced for the 10,000 inhabitants’ threshold.  
Table 2. Outcome and control variables - Descriptive statistics around the threshold (+/- 3,000 
inhabitants of the 10,000 threshold) 
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Outcomes 
Overall number of small retailers 810 185.48 86.09 35 449 
Number of grocery stores  810 57.28 34.22 5 202 
Number of ‘non-food’ stores 810 105.72 52.10 19 271 
Number of clothes and shoes stores 810 21.52 14.66 0 80 
Number of home products stores 810 28.65 16.31 2 87 
Number of other ‘non-food’ stores 810 55.57 24.77 12 129 
Controls 
Economic activity  810 0.947 0.161 0.61 1.25 
Compulsory education (%) 810 48.33 10.52 22.19 72.27 
Post-compulsory education (%) 810 35.35 9.10 10 62.51 
Square kilometres 810 106.72 117.69 2 586 
Immigrants (%) 810 2.54 3.37 0.02 21.92 
Unemployment rate (%) 810 14.79 9.43 4.07 61.23 
Importance of the services sectors (%) 810 50.78 12.05 20.32 81.77 
Source: Based on AEE and Census data. Notes: (1) The outcome variable is defined using AEE data and represents 
the universe of grocery stores at the municipality level. (2) The control variables are all extracted from the 2001 
Census. (3) The variable Economic activity represents the average of an index of the economic activity of each 
municipality. It is computed using data on the occupation and professional activity of the population in the 
municipality. The variables Compulsory education, Post-compulsory education and Immigrants are computed as a percentage 
of the overall population. The Importance of the services sectors variable is computed as a percentage of the overall 
activities within a municipality. 
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Table 3. Sample size 
Year Observations Big-Box Openings 
2003 307 4 
2004 307 4 
2005 795 11 
2006 955 31 
2007 1,431 68 
2008 1,662 46 
2009 1, 662 37 
2010 1, 662 49 
2011 1, 662 20 
Total 270 
Note: The initial sample comprised the 1,992 municipalities belonging to the nine regions that strengthened the 
central law that were bigger than 1,000 inhabitants. However, the sample shown here is a restricted sample based 
on the following criteria: municipalities with less than 30,000 inhabitants and having a big-box store before the 
period of analysis have been discarded. This means eliminating 238 municipalities from the sample. Additionally, 
92 municipalities that crossed the threshold over the period of analysis have also been excluded. Finally, 
municipalities are only included once their region has implemented the regulation; thus, for each year, the sample 
consists only of the regulated regions’ municipalities. 
Table 4. The effect of commercial regulations on big-box openings 
Dependent variable: Number of big-box openings 
Polynomial Regressions Local Linear Regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tit 0.307*** 0.311** 0.350*** 0.361*** 0.509** 0.526* 0.406* 
(0.113) (0.125) (0.113) (0.124) (0.251) (0.316) (0.219) 
Polynomials 1 2 1 2  --  -- -- 
Bandwidth  --  --  --  -- Optimal  -50%  +50% 
Controls No No Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 8,781 8,781 8,781 8,781 796 590 3,082 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The independent variable 
is a dummy that takes a value equal to one if the municipality is above the 10,000 inhabitants’ threshold and zero 
otherwise. (3) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order to control for region specific time 
invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks. (4) Columns (3) and (4) also include the pre-regulation levels 
of population, economic activity and education levels, size of the municipality in square kilometers, immigration 
level, unemployment and importance of the services sector in order to control for trends. (5) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1
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Table 5. Placebo test - The effect of commercial regulations on big-box openings in non-
regulated municipalities 
Dependent variable: Number of big-box openings 
Polynomial Regressions Local Linear Regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tit 0.049 0.057 0.046 0.055 -0.215 -0.510 -0.060 
(0.103) (0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.181) (0.336) (0.107) 
Polynomials 1 2 1 2  --  -- -- 
Bandwidth  --  --  --  -- Optimal  -50%  +50% 
Controls No No Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 3,437 3,437 3,437 3,437 397 172 1,132 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The sample used in all 
regressions consist on the pool of the non-regulated municipalities in each year. (3) The independent variable is a 
dummy that takes a value equal to one if the municipality is above the 10,000 inhabitants’ threshold and zero 
otherwise. (3) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order to control for region specific time 
invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks. (4) Columns (3) and (4) also include the pre-regulation levels 
of population, economic activity and education levels, size of the municipality in square kilometers, immigration 
level, unemployment and importance of the services sector. (5) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. The effect of big-box openings on grocery stores 
Dependent variable: Change in the number of 
grocery stores 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Big-Box openings t, t-1 
Coef. 0.080 0.777 -2.081 -1.690 
s.e. (2.565) (2.666) (2.356) (2.315) 
Obs. 8,781 8,781 8,781 8,781 
Big-Box openings t, t-2 
Coef. -2.730 -1.371 -5.977* -5.023 
s.e. (3.858) (3.821) (3.534) (3.450) 
Obs. 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
Big-Box openings t, t-3 
Coef. -5.431 -4.284 -8.585** -7.700* 
s.e. (4.598) (4.562) (4.221) (4.140) 
Obs. 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 
Big-Box openings t, t-4 
Coef. -6.381 -6.534 -8.908** -9.149** 
s.e. (4.665) (4.692) (4.288) (4.271) 
Obs. 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795 
Big-Box openings t, t-5 
Coef. -5.981 -8.090** -8.059** -9.727*** 
s.e. (3.684) (3.824) (3.322) (3.437) 
Obs. 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 
Big-Box openings t, t-6 
Coef. -8.157** -12.38*** -8.147** -11.51*** 
s.e. (3.990) (4.271) (3.586) (3.809) 
Obs. 1,409 1,409 1,409 1,409 
Polynomials 1 2 1 2 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The independent 
variable is the number of big-box openings between t and t-n at the municipality level, instrumented by a 
dummy that captures the change in the probability of treatment due to the commercial regulation. Each row 
represents a different regression. (3) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order to control 
for region specific time invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks. (4) Columns (3) and (4) also 
include the pre-regulation levels of population, economic activity and education levels, size of the municipality 
in square kilometers, immigration level, unemployment and importance of the services sector in order to 
control for trends. (5) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. The effect of big-box openings on grocery store closures – Heterogeneous effects 
Dependent variable: Change in the number of grocery stores 
Polynomial regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Big-Box  
openings t, t-3 
Close to the city center -10.76*** -9.752** 
(Location=1) (4.130) (4.055) 
Far from the city center 2.675 3.925 
(Location=0) (5.285) (5.197) 
Discount 0.099 0.442 
(Type=1) (2.637) (2.612) 
Conventional -11.04** -10.10** 
(Type=0) (4.669) (4.591) 
Polynomials 1 2 1 2 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The independent variable 
is the number of big-box openings between t and t-3, instrumented by a dummy that captures the change in the 
probability of treatment due to the commercial regulation. In columns (1) and (2), this variable is interacted with a 
dummy variable equal to one if the big-box is opened close to the city center – between 1km and 2km from the 
town hall and zero if it is opened far away from it, i.e. more than 2km away. In columns (3) and (4) the dummy 
variable is interacted with a dummy equal to zero if the big-box is considered to be a conventional supermarket, 
i.e. selling all brands and equal to one if it is a discount big-box, i.e. typically selling their own, lower price brands. 
(3) The coefficients shown correspond to the overall effects of each category (baseline and interaction for the 
values equal to 1 and baseline for those equal to 0). (4) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order 
to control for region specific time invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks. They also include the pre-
regulation levels of population, economic activity and education levels, size of the municipality in square kilometers, 
immigration level, unemployment and importance of the services sector in order to control for trends. (4) *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. The effect of big-box openings on other retailers 
Dependent variable: Change in the number of other retailers' shops 
Clothes and shoes Home products Others All other retailers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Big-Box 
openings t, t-3 
-1.601* -1.744** 6.603*** 6.711*** 7.099*** 6.801*** 12.07*** 11.76*** 
(0.888) (0.874) (0.916) (0.907) (1.249) (1.215) (2.509) (2.455) 
Observations 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 
Polynomials 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The independent variable is 
the number of big box openings between t and t-3 at the municipality level, instrumented by a dummy that captures 
the change in the probability of treatment due to the commercial regulation. Each row represents a different 
regression. (3) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order to control for region specific time 
invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks as well as the pre-regulation levels of population, economic 
activity and education levels, size of the municipality in square kilometers, immigration level, unemployment and 
importance of the services sectors in order to control for trends. (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 9. The effect of big-box openings all retailers 
Dependent variable: Change in the number of all retailers 
Grocery stores Other retailers All retailers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Big-Box openings t, t-3 -8.585** -7.700* 12.07*** 11.76*** 1.588 2.848 
(4.221) (4.140) (2.509) (2.455) (5.705) (5.617) 
Observations 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 
Polynomials 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The independent variable 
is the number of big box openings between t and t-3 at the municipality level, instrumented by a dummy that 
captures the change in the probability of treatment due to the commercial regulation. Each row represents a 
different regression. (3) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order to control for region specific 
time invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks and also the pre-regulation levels of population, 
economic activity and education levels, size of the municipality in square kilometers, immigration level, 
unemployment and importance of the services sectors in order to control for trends. (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1. The effect of big-box openings on grocery stores – Robustness checks 
Dependent variable: Change in the number of grocery stores 
Local linear 
regressions 
Openings before the 
law 
3-years-lagged 
population 
5-years-lagged 
population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Big-Box 
openings t, t-3 
-3.937 -13.92 -10.09* -11.48** -9.229** -8.398** -7.336* -6.437 
(10.83) (32.42) (5.421) (5.372) (4.258) (4.202) (4.155) (4.045) 
First stage 0.611** 0.763** 0.351*** 0.410*** 0.468*** 0.482*** 0.474*** 0.493*** 
(0.277) (0.327) (0.132) (0.117) (0.141) (0.157) (0.142) (0.157) 
Observations 435 841 5,857 5,857 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 
Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level (2) The independent variable is the 
number of big-box openings between t and t-3 at the municipality level, instrumented by a dummy that captures the 
change in the probability of treatment due to the commercial regulation. (3) Columns (1) and (2) show the results of 
running local linear regressions using the optimal bandwidth. Columns (3) and (4) present the results when including all 
the municipalities that experienced a big-box opening before the regional law was implemented. Columns (5) and (6) 
and (7) and (8) report the results when using the 3-year lagged population and the 5-year lagged population as running 
variables respectively. (4) All regressions include region and time fixed effects in order to control for region specific time 
invariant characteristics and countrywide time shocks. They also include the pre-regulation levels of population, 
economic activity and education levels, size of the municipality in square kilometers, immigration level, unemployment 
and importance of the services sector in order to control for trends. (5) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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